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SEARCHES SOUTH OF THE BORDER: ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE SEIZED BY FOREIGN OFFICIALS
In Mapp v. Ohio' the Supreme Court effectively closed all court-
room doors to evidence obtained through an unreasonable search by
either federal or state law enforcement officials. 2 Current efforts to con-
trol narcotics traffic have raised questions of the treatment to be
accorded evidence acquired by foreign officers.
In Brulay v. United States the Ninth Circuit affirmed the admis-
sion of evidence seized in Mexico and introduced in a criminal prose-
cution by the United States. 4 The evidence probably would have been
excluded if the seizure had been made by federal officers. 5 The court
held it admissible, however, since neither federal nor state officers
were involved in the search. Incriminating statements made by the
defendant during a prolonged interrogation by Mexican police were
likewise admitted. The fourth amendment6 was held inapplicable
to acts committed by foreign officials within their own jurisdiction,7
since any violation was complete at the time and place of the search
and seizure.8 The fifth amendment was satisfied by the trial court's
finding that the statements were made voluntarily.9 The case thus raises
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Today we . . . close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.
Id. at 654-55.
3 383 F.2d 845 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
4 Brulay was convicted of conspiring to smuggle amphetamine tablets into the
United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 545 (1964). He was arrested by Tijuana police
officers who noticed that his car looked heavy in the rear. Following his arrest without a
warrant, he opened the trunk of the car at the request of the officers, revealing several
hundred pounds of amphetamine tablets. After prolonged questioning at the police
station, he led officers to a house in Tijuana where an additional 1980 pounds of tablets
were found. Possession and transportation of amphetamines apparently were not violations
of Mexican law at the time of Brulay's arrest.
5 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Weeks rule requires exclusion
of evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights when such evidence is introduced in a federal prosecution. In the principal case
Brulay argued that the evidence seized should be excluded because there was neither
probable cause for his arrest nor a warrant for the searches.
6 U.S. CONr. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
7 883 F.2d at 348.
8 Id. at 349 n.5.
9 Id.
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questions regarding the standards to be applied when evidence ob-
tained by foreign officers acting within their own jurisdiction is intro-
duced in a criminal prosecution in a United States court.
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
IN THE UNITED STATES
At common law, evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure
was nevertheless admissible in a criminal trial,10 since its admission
did not conflict with either purpose of the rules of evidence: to enable
the trial court to reach the truth and to secure a fair trial for the ac-
cused.1 Since incriminating evidence obtained in an unlawful search
may be just as true and reliable as that acquired in a legitimate manner,
there was arguably no justification for its exclusion.' 2
In contrast to the common law rule, Weeks v. United States 3
adopted an exclusionary rule for federal criminal proceedings when
federal officers had violated the fourth amendment rights of the accused.
The rule was a prophylactic measure designed to control the conduct
of federal officers. 14 The Court later applied the Weeks rule to unlaw-
10 See, e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657
(1926); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841) (dictum). See generally
8 J. WimzoRm, EvmENCE § 2183 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
11 See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 442-43, 282 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
12 Holding illegally obtained evidence inadmissible results only in the apparently
guilty accused going free and in the officer who conducted the unlawful search suffering
a mild, indirect rebuke. Arguably, the officer should be punished more sternly, perhaps
to the extent of a direct fine or imprisonment. In theory, the offending officer can be
held liable in a civil action or a criminal prosecution for his trespass. But the prospects
of success in such an action are questionable, because the jury may be indisposed to
award damages to a person convicted of crime as a result of the search. Likewise the jury
may not wish to punish an officer when his efforts, even though unconstitutional, have
exposed the complaining party's criminal activity. See notes 21 & 23 infra.
13 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The defendant had been arrested and his room searched
without a warrant. He was subsequently convicted on the basis of evidence thus obtained.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered the illegally seized papers
returned to the defendant.
14 The Court reasoned that the incidence of such unlawful searches would be
substantially reduced if federal officers were on notice that any evidence obtained as a
result thereof could not be utilized in prosecution of the accused. By removing this
apparent incentive to violate an individual's constitutional rights, the privacy of law-
abiding citizens is theoretically enhanced. The Court stated:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions . . . should
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have
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fil searches conducted jointly by federal and state officials.' 5 Evidence,
was also excluded when seized by state officials acting alone if, be-
cause of the nature of the offense charged, the search was deemed to
have been on behalf of the federal government. 16 More recently the
Court discarded the remnants of the "silver platter" doctrine1 7 by hold-
a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 392.
To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest
neglect if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended
for the protection of the people against such unauthorized action.
Id. at 394.
15 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927). Evidence was seized during a search
under a state warrant that would have been invalid by fourth amendment standards. A
federal prohibition agent was invited to participate in the search and did so, "as a federal
enforcement officer, upon the chance, which was subsequently realized, that something
would be disclosed of official interest to him as such agent." Id at 32. The Court held:
The participation of the agent in the search was under color of his federal
office and... the search in substance' and effect was a joint operation of the local
and federal officers. In that view . . the effect is the same as though he had
engaged in the undertaking as one exclusively his own.
Id. at 33. This holding appears to require exclusion if a federal officer participates in a
foreign search. The issue then is one of determining what constitutes participation. For
example, is a federal officer participating if he gives information leading foreign officers
to conduct a search, or if he requests such a search? Or must he actually accompany the
foreign officers in the venture?
16 Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). Gambino was arrested by New York
state troopers and searched without a warrant and without probable cause. Intoxicating
liquor was found in his automobile. He and the liquor were turned over to federal
officers for prosecution for violation of the National Prohibition Act. The Court stated:
It is true that the troopers were not shown to have acted under the directions of
the federal officials in making the arrest and seizure. But the rights guaranteed
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments may be invaded as effectively by such
cofperation, as by the state officers' acting under direction of the federal
officials. . . . The prosecution thereupon instituted by the federal authorities
was . .. in effect a ratification of the arrest, search and seizure made by the
troopers on behalf of the United States.
Id. at 316-17. The Gambino case is analogous to the foreign search. Distinctions may be
drawn based on the original purpose of the foreign officers--i.e., their search originally
may have been intended to detect violations of foreign law, or it may have been
intended to assist United States officials in their law enforcement efforts. A second distinc-
tion recognizes that foreign officials are not part of our governmental system, as are state
police officers. The fact remains that the evidence obtained is used in our federal courts
to prove a violation of federal law. If the arrest is wrongful by constitutional standards
and the evidence used only in a federal prosecution, Gambino may require exclusion.
17 The "silver platter" term was coined by Justice Frankfurter in Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949) (dictum):
The crux of [the Byars] ... doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal
official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a silver
platter.
In Lustig a federal agent informed local police of his suspicion that the accused was
counterfeiting. The police issued a warrant for his arrest on another grouiid, entered and
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ing that federal prosecutors could no longer use any evidence unconsti-
tutionally seized by state officials even without implication of either a
federal involvement or a federal objective in the search. 18
Wolf v. Colorado"9 extended federal control over the conduct of
state officials. There the Court announced that the right of privacy,
searched his room during his absence, and found evidence of counterfeiting. The federal
agent arrived later and examined the evidence. He was present when the accused returned
and was arrested. Although the agent did not request the search and it was not under-
taken specifically to help the federal prosecution, his selection and removal of evidenice
was held to be part of the search. The case, however, does not indicate the limits of when
a federal official "has a hand" in the search or when he might be deemed not to have
participated in it within the meaning of Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
See note 15 supra.
18 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The search and seizure, conducted
under a state warrant, were held unlawful by the state courts. The defendant was sub-
sequently convicted in a federal court on the basis of evidence seized in the unlawful
search. In holding such evidence inadmissible, the Supreme Court stated:
Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement
officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation is
hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers to withdraw
from such association and at least tacitly to encourage state officers in the dis-
regard of constitutionally protected freedom. If, on the other hand, it is under-
stood that the fruit of an unlawful search by state agents will be inadmissible in
a federal trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with respect
to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation. Instead, forthright coopera-
tion under constitutional standards will be promoted and fostered.
Id. at 221-22 (dictum).
The same arguments regarding cooperation and subterfuge may be advanced with
regard to the activities of federal and foreign officers. See pp. 895-96 infra. Justice Frank-
furter's dissent in Elkins is illustrative of the persuasive arguments favoring admission
of such evidence:
We are concerned with a rule governing the admissibility of relevant
evidence in federal courts. The pertinent general principle, responding to the
deepest needs of society, is that society is entitled to every man's evidence. As
the underlying aim of judicial inquiry is ascertainable truth, everything rationally
related to ascertaining the truth is presumptively admissible. Limitations are
properly placed upon the operation of this general principle only to the very
limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence
has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing
all rational means for ascertaining truth.
Id. at 234. A public good may readily be found in- exclusion of evidence seized illegally
by domestic officials if such exclusion reduces the incidence of such searches. Whether
an equivalent public benefit would result from exclusion of foreign evidence may be
questioned. It is not certain that exclusion would alter foreign search policies, nor is it
clear that such an alteration is a justifiable motive for actions by the federal courts. It is
possible, however, that exclusion would benefit all citizens of the foreign state by
encouraging revision of search practices. Likewise, the benefit might flow only to
Americans abroad, at least to the extent that such searches are undertaken with the sole
motive of providing evidence for a United States prosecution.
19 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The defendant was convicted by a state court for a state
offense. Evidence was admitted that had been obtained under circumstances that would
have rendered it inadmissible ia federal coiftt. . " .
1968]
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protected against federal infringement by the fourth amendment, is
likewise protected against the states by the fourteenth amendment.20
The exclusionary rule was not applied, however, since there were other
available remedies that might be more effective if consistently en-
forced by the states.21 In Mapp v. Ohio,22 decided twelve years later, the
Court determined that the other remedies had not proven effective and
that exclusion was constitutionally required23 Both federal and state
20 The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which
is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty" and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 27-28.
21 Though the Court recognized the existence of other remedies, it did not express its
opinion as to how well those remedies were enforced. Writing for the Court, Justice
Frankfurter stated:
The jurisdictions which have rejected the Weeks doctrine have not left the
right to privacy without other means of protection. Indeed, the exclusion of
evidence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose
person or premises something incriminating has been found. We cannot, there-
fore, regard it as a departure from basic standards to remand such persons,
together with those who emerge scatheless from a search, to the remedies of
private action and such protection as the internal discipline of the police, under
the eyes of-an alert public opinion, may afford. Granting that in practice the
exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deterring unreasonable
searches, it is not for this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal
standards assured by the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other
methods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective. . . . We
cannot brush aside the experience of States which deem the incidence of such
conduct by the police too slight to call for a deterrent remedy not by way
of disciplinary measures but by overriding the relevant rules of evidence. There
are, moreover, reasons for excluding evidence unreasonably obtained by the
federal police which are less compelling in the case of police under State or local
authority. The public opinion of a community can far more effectively be
exerted against oppressive conduct on the part of police directly responsible
to the community itself than can local opinion, sporadically aroused, be brought
to bear upon remote authority pervasively exerted throughout the country.
Id. at 30-33 (footnotes omitted). Among the other remedies cited were actions for
damages against the searcher, use of force to resist an unlawful search, and statutory
provisions penalizing officers conducting such searches. Id. at 80 n.1. See Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rzv. 493 (1955).
22 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23 Several years earlier, in adopting the exclusionary rule, Justice Traynor stated
for the California Supreme Court:
[We have concluded . . . that evidence obtained in violation of the constitu-
tional guarantees is inadmissible. . . . We have been compelled to reach that
conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance
with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant
result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required to
participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement
officers.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955) (footnotes omitted).
[C]ase after case has appeared in our appellate reports describing unlawful
searches and seizures against the defendant on trial, and those cases undoubtedly
reflect only a small fraction of the violations of the constitutional provisions
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courts are thus barred from using evidence obtained through violation
of constitutional rights by federal or state officers.
It is still possible, however, for a prosecutor to use evidence unlaw-
fully obtained by a private person acting on his own initiative, even
though that evidence would be excluded if acquired in the same man-
ner by an officer. The rationale of this exception, announced in Burdeau
v. McDowell,24 is that, since the fourth amendment limits only govern-
mental action and no government official is involved in a search by a
private individual, there is no constitutional reason to exclude the evi-
dence. The Burdeau holding has been attacked in the lower courts
several times recently in both civil and criminal cases with varying
degrees of success.25
In Brulay the Ninth Circuit recognized an additional exception to
the exclusionary rule by admitting evidence seized by foreign officials.26
Several approaches may be taken in evaluating this exception. Resolu-
tion of the issue requires consideration of the constitutional arguments
for excluding such evidence and of policy factors favoring exclusion
based on the supervisory powers of the courts over the administration
of criminal justiceY
that have actually occurred. On the other hand, reported cases involving civil
actions against police officers are rare, and those involving successful criminal
prosecutions against officers are nonexistent. In short, the constitutional provisions
are not being enforced.
Id. at 448, 282 P.2d at 913.
24 256 U.S. 465 (1921). McDowell was suspected by his employer of fraudulent conduct
in the course of business operations. A company official and private detectives took
possession of McDowell's office, forced open his safes and desk, and removed various
papers. These papers were later turned over to the Justice Department for use in
prosecution of McDowell for fraudulent use of the mails.
I. 26 See Williams v. United States, 282 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1960) (dictum that Elkins
had changed the Burdeau rule). Evidence seized by private parties was admitted over
defendants' objections in the following criminal cases: Barnes v. United States, 378 F.2d
517 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Goldberg, 380 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 877 U.S.
958 (1964); United States v. Frank, 225 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 847 F.2d 486
(D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965); People v. Randazzo, 220 Cal. App. 2d
768, 84 Ca. Rptr. 65 (1968), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 1000 (1964); People v. Torres, 49 Misc.
2d 39, 266 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
Evidence unlawfully obtained by private persons was excluded in two divorce
actions: Del Presto v, Del Presto, 92 N.J. Super. 805, 228 A.2d 217 (Ch. 1966); Williams v.
Williams, 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. 1966). Contra, Sackler v. Sackler, 15 N.Y.2d
40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1964).
26 The Fifth Circuit also has admitted evidence seized in Mexico. Birdsell v. United
States, 846 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 882 U.S. 968 (1965). Birdsell was convicted
of transporting stolen automobiles from the United States to Mexico and of a related
conspiracy offense.
27 What is here invoked is the Court's supervisory power over the administration
of criminal justice in the federal courts, under which the Court has "from the
1968]
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II
ARGUMENTS FAVORING EXCLUSION
A. Constitutional Basis
The Supreme Court clarified the constitutional origin of the ex-
clusionary rule when it declared in Mapp that "all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that
same authority, inadmissible in a state court."' Thus, the exclusionary
rule is not merely an exercise of the supervisory powers of the Court,
but rather a constitutional requirement. Concurring in Mapp, Justice
Black expressed doubt that the fourth amendment alone would compel
exclusion; but when he considered it together with the fifth amend-
ment ban against self-incrimination, he found a constitutional theory
that not only supports but actually requires exclusion.2 This develop-
ment leads to the premise that the constitutional violation may not be
complete at the time of the unlawful search, but rather continues
throughout the prosecution if the evidence obtained is admitted at
trial. Although the original fourth amendment violation may be com-
plete, the fifth amendment may also be violated when the product of
the earlier transgression is admitted over defendant's objection. Such
an interaction of the fourth and fifth amendments had been suggested
previously by the Court.30
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in
federal criminal prosecutions."
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (dictum), quoting McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943).
For a summary listing of the arguments for and against exclusion generally, see
Berman & Oberst, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search and
Seizure-Federal Problems, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 525, 533-35 (1960).
28 367 U.S. at 655.
29 Id. at 661-62.
30 The original judicial exposition of the relationship is found in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886):
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments.
They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and
seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the
purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in crim-
inal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search
and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been
unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be
a witness against himself.
Similar language is found in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927) (see note 16
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A similar approach in the foreign search situation can be sup-
ported by the theory that the fourth amendment may be violated
initially when the search is conducted, and again when evidence result-
ing from the initial transgression is admitted at trial.31 Although the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit use of the evidence, there may
be a sufficient overlap between the fourth and fifth amendments to bar
use of all incriminating evidence obtained in a manner violative of the
fourth amendment. Even though the search and seizure in a Brulay
situation does not itself violate the fourth amendment, since it is
conducted by foreign officers on foreign soil, the privilege against self-
incrimination may be violated when the evidence is admitted at trial
to the same extent as if the search had been led by federal officers. The
difficulty with this interaction approach is that there appears to be no
overlap if the search itself is not unconstitutional. When the fourth
amendment violation is removed from the picture, the defendant must
rely on the fifth amendment alone. The Court's decision in Schmerber
v. California2 indicates that the defendant in that case could not rely
on the fifth amendment alone to exclude the evidence, since fifth
amendment protection extends only to communicative matter, such as
testimony and writings.38 Exclusion of evidence of a physical nature
thus requires a fourth amendment violation to support the purported
overlap of the fifth. Without such support a defense based on the fifth
amendment alone falls.
The Supreme Court previously has required exclusion on fifth
amendment grounds of a confession obtained through coercion by
foreign officers. 34 It is likely that other foreign evidence obtained under
supra); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255
US. 298, 306 (1921). That such a relationship might exist was suggested prior to any of
the above decisions:
It is believed that under [the fourth] ... amendment, the seizure of one's papers,
in order to obtain evidence against him, is dearly forbidden; and the spirit of the
fifth amendment, that no person shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to be a
witness against himself, would also forbid such seizure.
T. COOLEY, CONsTrruTiONAL LIMrrATIONS 305-06 n.5 (Ist ed. 1868).
31 See Note, The Fourth Amendment Right of Privacy: Mapping the Future, 53 VA.
L. RFv. 1314, 1346-47 (1967).
32 384 US. 757 (1966).
33 The defendant had been involved in an automobile accident. After detecting
signs of drunkenness, a police officer directed that a blood sample be withdrawn and
analyzed by a physician at the hospital where the defendant was being treated for
injuries. Admission of the.blood analysis in evidence was upheld. Id. at 761.
34 Bram v. United'States, 168.U.S. 532 (1897). The defendant was accused of murder
on a ship at sea. He was put ashore in Nova Scotia and questioned there after being
stripped of his clothing. The questioning elicited incriminating statements that were used
by the prosecution in a federal trial. Brain's conviction was reversed because of the coercion
1968)
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conditions that shock the conscience would also be excluded. 5 When
force upon the defendant's person is employed in a search and seizure,
as in the extorted confession case, the accused becomes the unwilling
instrument of his own conviction. Consideration of the fifth amend-
ment privilege invoked at trial in such search and seizure cases36 indi-
cates that the evidence should be excluded. The issue then becomes the
determination of the degree of force that warrants exclusion. A log-
ical point at which to draw the line is where the fourth amendment
would require it to be drawn if the search took place within the
United States.
B. The Official Action Approach
A further argument in favor of exclusion rests on the premise that
judicial action is official or governmental action within the meaning
of the constitutional prohibitions. That court action may be deemed
state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment is evident,8 7
though the Supreme Court has not yet extended the concept beyond
cases involving racial discrimination.3 8 Under this theory, a fourth
amendment violation is renewed at trial if the illegally obtained evi-
dence is admitted over the defendant's objection. 39 Evidence obtained
illegally in a foreign jurisdiction would thus be excluded even though
the searching officers are not subject to the Constitution. The concept
of a secondary fourth amendment violation at trial eliminates the prob-
lems raised by application of the theory of overlapping fourth and fifth
amendment violations in the foreign search context.
Moreover, the Supreme Court indicated in Weeks that courts
involved. According to the Court, the fact that the interrogation occurred in a foreign state
was significant only because of possible increased fear on the part of the accused. This
fear factor could well be magnified in a country such as Mexico, where both the language
and the legal system are unfamiliar to United States citizens.
35 See Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 n.10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 963 (1965):
We do not mean to say that in a case where federal officials had induced
foreign police to engage in conduct that shocked the conscience, a federal court,
in the exercise of its supervisory powers . . . might not refuse to allow the
prosecution to enjoy the fruits of such action.
36 See cases cited note 30 supra.
37 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14
(1948).
88 See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLur. L. Rav. 1083 (1960);
Comment, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Cases, 19 BAYLOR I RPEv.
263 (1967); Note, Seizures -by Private Parties: Exclusion in Criminal Cases, 19 STAN. L. Rxv.
608 (1967); Note, supra note 31, at 1356.
39 See generally Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NmB. L. R~v.
185 (1961).
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should be bound by the same constitutional standards as are investigat
ing officers.40 It has also been suggested that the activities of the prose-
cution and those of the courts cannot be separated in reviewing
criminal convictions.41 Excluding unlawfully seized evidence not only
removes a major incentive for violation of individual rights by officials,
but also eliminates the condonation of such activities that necessarily
accompanies acceptance of their products as evidence. The upholding
of judicial integrity as a basis for exclusion is not contrary to earlier
search and seizure decisions except those involving searches by private
individuals. 42 This basis for exclusion has found support also as a
means of maintaining and increasing public respect for the judiciary.43
This public response will theoretically follow when it is understood
that the courts will not allow officials to benefit from their own law-
breaking in order to convict a criminal suspect.
C. Practical Considerations
A third factor favoring exclusion is the fear of collusion among law
enforcement officials if illegally seized evidence is routinely accepted.4
Arguably, use of foreign evidence would ease the burden on domestic
law enforcement officers, especially in the area of narcotics control.
Searches and seizures without regard for the fourth amendment stan-
dards may become routine in neighboring countries, since they may
prove to be more efficient than searches adhering to constitutional stan-
dards. A return on an international basis to the "silver platter" era,
40 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). See note 14 supra.
41 [N]o distinction can be taken between the Government as prosecutor and the
Government as judge. If the existing code does not permit district attorneys to
have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit the judge to allow such
iniquities to succeed.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); Olmstead v. United States, supra at 485
(Brandeis, J., dissenting); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 912,
914 (1955); Broeder, supra note 99, at 214.
42 The most extreme application of the judicial integrity and judicial action theories
would render inadmissible all evidence obtained by any illegal act in both civil and
criminal cases, whether the act was committed by private persons or by officials. See note
25 supra.
43 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 914 (1955).
44 A similar fear was expressed in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (1961) (dictum):
"Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends
naturally to breed legitimate sbspicion of 'Working arrangements' whose results are
equally tainted." See also Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), where the Court
affirmed an order enjoining a federal agent from transferring to state authorities evidence
that he had seizdd under an invalid warant and from testifying with respect to such
evidence in the state courts.
1968]
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seemingly put to rest in Elkins v. United States,45- 'would result. Al-
though international collusion would compel exclusion of the evidence
under existing law, the difficulties in proving collusion appear greater
in the international situation than in the federal-state situation. Coop-
eration within constitutional standards among federal, state, and for-
eign officials in law enforcement should be encouraged,4 6 but collusion
among the same agencies without regard for constitutional require-
ments must be condemned, and rules of evidence that encourage such
activities should be changed.
III
ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXCLUSION
The common law arguments regarding admissibility of evidence
may still be viable. Their basis is that evidence obtained illegally can
be just as reliable as that acquired legitimately. An exclusionary rule
reduces the efficiency of criminal justice by denying the court access
to relevant material.47 If the court's only interest were in determining
guilt or innocence of the accused, exclusion would not be justified.
Courts, however, must serve other, equally important objectives.4
There appears to be no direct evidence that adoption of the exclu-
sionary rule has hindered law enforcement;49 there are, however,
indications that admission of illegally seized evidence leads to increas-
ingly frequent violations of the rights protected by the fourth amend-
ment.50 Exclusion, therefore, serves to protect innocent victims of illegal
searches as well as to discipline offending officers.
Our courts admittedly do not have the authority to discipline for-
eign officers. On the other hand, there is nothing requiring blanket
acceptance of the products of foreign searches without inquiry into and
approval of the methods used, especially if the foreign search was
directed solely towards collection of evidence for a prosecution in
United States courts.51 If the effect of the fourth amendment is limited
45 364 U.S. 206 (1960). See notes 17-18 supra.
46 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 (1960).
47 See Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Elkins, quoted in note 18 supra.
48 Courts are properly concerned with maintaining judicial integrity, enforcing
constitutional limitations, and discouraging certain police practices. See pp. 894-95 supra.
49 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960).
5o People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955), quoted in note 23
supra.
5i Compare Birdsell v. United Siates, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cii.), cert. denied,. 383 U.S.
963 (1965)' (arrest and search in Mexico for violation 'af laws of'botli Meico'afnd United
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to the immediate search, there could be no constitutional violation in
the foreign evidence situation, because the search occurs outside the
United States and is conducted by foreign officers deriving their au-
thority from an independent soverign. Foreign officials owe no allegi-
ance to the laws of the United States, nor are they subject to the juris-
diction of its courts. Arguably, therefore, our- courts should accept such
evidence upon its proven competence, and should not inquire into the
means of its acquisition. This approach, however, disregards the possi-
bility that the same search might also have violated foreign law.r2
Perhaps the same exception to the exclusionary rule currently
applied to searches by private persons should be adopted for searches
by foreign officials, since neither is expressly proscribed by the Consti-
tution, and since United States courts could not directly regulate the
conduct of foreign officials acting within their own jurisdiction. This
solution, however, ignores the remedies available to the victim of an
unlawful search by a private citizen, including criminal prosecution and
civil damage suits based on trespass. Although as a practical matter these
remedies may be illusory, they are more likely to be effective against
unlawful private searches than against searches conducted by foreign
officials. The activities complained of may not be unlawful in the
foreign state, and it will be very difficult, probably impossible, to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the offending officer in the United States.
The victim, whether innocent or guilty, is left without any effective
relief. Exclusion, however, might operate to reduce the incidence of
illegal searches in conjunction with United States law enforcement by
removing the offending foreign officer's incentive.
A final argument against exclusion is that it might impair relations
with foreign governments by giving the impression that the United
States courts will ignore their efforts at law enforcement, or that our
courts are attempting to apply the Constitution extraterritorially. The
Constitution is not exported, however, when the courts simply obey its
mandates as they apply to judicial actions. Nor does exclusion impair
the internal law enforcement ability of the foreign government, since
it may still prosecute Americans for violations of its laws using its own
States, see note 26 supra), with Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967) (no violation of Mexican law).
52 If a search by foreign officers would have been unconstitutional if conducted by
federal agents and is actually unconstitutional according to the foreign law, exclusion of
the seized evidence seems most appropriate. Cf. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960). The status of the evidence is less clear if the search is merely illegal, but not
unconstitutional according to the foreign law. The third situation, presented by Brulay,
is a search neither illegal nor unconstitutional by the standards of the foreign sovereign.
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procedural rules. If exclusion of evidence results in a dismissal of
charges or an acquittal in United States courts, the foreign sovereign
may still pursue prosecution for violation of its own laws under exist-
ing extradition treaties. But exclusion will make clear to all nations
that United States courts will not wink at foreign violations of rights
considered basic to all persons brought before them.
CONCLUSION
The scarcity of cases dealing with the foreign evidence problem
indicates that the issue arises infrequently and that foreign evidence
plays a relatively minor role in our domestic law enforcement. The con-
stitutional basis of the exclusionary rule and the practical consequences
of applying a more lenient standard to evidence obtained abroad indi-
cate that foreign evidence should be admitted only if the constitutional
safeguards required in domestic searches were respected in the foreign
search. This rule will place all nations on notice of the high regard of
our courts for individuals' rights, and will relieve the courts of the prob-
lem of applying different standards according to the place where the
search occurred. The rule does not export the Constitution or impose
its terms upon a foreign sovereign; it merely refuses to condone a lesser
standard of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
outside the territorial limits of the United States.
Harry S. Chandler
